Is a philosophical zombie possible?

A 2013 survey of professional philosophers conducted by Bourget and Chalmers produced the following results: 35.6% said P Zombies were conceivable but not metaphysically possible; 23.3% said they were metaphysically possible; 16.0% said they were inconceivable; and 25.1% responded “other.”

What is the zombie theory?

With its diverse disciplinary and methodological approaches, Zombie Theory thinks through what the walking undead reveal about our relationships to the world and to each other.

Is Chalmers a Physicalist?

Chalmers argues for an “explanatory gap” from the objective to the subjective, and criticizes physicalist explanations of mental experience, making him a dualist. He has also characterized his view by more traditional formulations such as property dualism.

Who introduces the idea of Eliminative materialism?

The term “eliminative materialism” was first introduced by James Cornman in 1968 while describing a version of physicalism endorsed by Rorty. The later Ludwig Wittgenstein was also an important inspiration for eliminativism, particularly with his attack on “private objects” as “grammatical fictions”.

What makes a problem of consciousness easy?

The easy problems of consciousness are those that seem directly susceptible to the standard methods of cognitive science, whereby a phenomenon is explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. The hard problems are those that seem to resist those methods.

What is Conceivability argument?

The conceivability argument — which assumes physicalism entails that zombies are impossible — purports to refute it by showing they are possible. As we saw, the simplest version of this argument goes: (1) zombies are conceivable; (2) whatever is conceivable is possible; (3) therefore zombies are possible.

Who asserted that self does not exist?

Chapter XXVII on “Identity and Diversity” in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Locke, 1689/1997) has been said to be one of the first modern conceptualisations of consciousness as the repeated self-identification of oneself, in which Locke gives his account of identity and personal identity in the second edition …

What does Eliminative materialism eliminate?

Like dualists, eliminative materialists insist that ordinary mental states cannot be reduced to or identified with neurological events or processes. However, unlike dualists, straightforward eliminativists claim there is nothing more to the mind than what occurs in the brain.

Is a philosophical zombie possible? A 2013 survey of professional philosophers conducted by Bourget and Chalmers produced the following results: 35.6% said P Zombies were conceivable but not metaphysically possible; 23.3% said they were metaphysically possible; 16.0% said they were inconceivable; and 25.1% responded “other.” What is the zombie theory? With its diverse disciplinary and…